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S y s t e m s
Dynamical-systems analysis is nowadays ubiquitous. From engi­
neering (its point o f  origin and natural home) to physiology, and from 
psychology to ecology, it enjoys surprisingly wide application. 
Sometimes the analysis rings decisively false— as, for example, when 
adopted in certain treatments o f historical narrative;1 other times it is 
provocative and controversial, as when applied to the phenomena o f  mind 
and cognition.2 Dynamical systems analysis (or “Systems" with a capital 
“S,” as 1 shall sometimes refer to it) is simply a tool o f  analysis. It 
mobilizes the language and mathematical technology o f  differential 
equations, and brings into play the distinctive concepts o f  equilibrium  and 
attractor, as well as gain, coupling  and neighborhood, that are not 
obviously proprietary property o f any particular domain o f  objects or 
regime in the world.3 It is the ecumenical language o f  engineers, universal 
in scope.
Still, Systems, as a mode o f analysis, itself stands in need o f clarifi­
cation. Once that clarity has been attained, one can then ask: are there 
limitations or bounds on proper application o f  Systems analysis, that are 
themselves premised upon considerations internal to the analysis itself? 
This is one o f  several questions to which the present essay is devoted. 
Before it can be attempted, however, we shall require some groundwork 
that clarifies the mode o f  analysis that is Systems— the family o f  analyses 
to which it belongs. This will begin to bring out (among other things) the 
precise difference o f  subject matter between biology and physics. And the 
ecumenicality o f  Systems analysis is bound to have its own distinctive 
commitments, as we shall see.
Practitioners attuned to the signal characteristics o f  Systems 
analysis— characteristics that set it apart— proclaim its many advantages
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over other styles o f  analysis. Indeed some Systems prophets, both early 
and late, proclaim that it resolves numerous philosophical difficulties, 
including the perennial mind-body problem and the late-comer “problem 
o f  consciousness.”4 It would thus be o f  some considerable use to have a 
systematic (pun intended) treatment o f  these advantages, and why they 
fall to the Systems approach over against rivals. Indeed it would be o f  
some considerable use simply to have a clear characterization o f  the 
contrast between the Systems approach and its rivals. That characteriza­
tion shall be the centerpiece and focus o f  this study.
Norbert Weiner, apostle o f  the Systems approach to the natural 
sciences and engineering— and who, incidentally, preferred the term “cy­
bernetics” (from the Greek term for steersmanship) for this style o f  
treatment— contrasted it with Newtonian causal analysis. He maintained 
that the Newtonian analysis is “linear,” but that the Systems analysis 
provides also for “circular” causation.5 The position was premised on 
analysis o f  the way time entered in each; according to Weiner, time in the 
Newtonian approach, is reversible; hence there is nothing new under the 
sun because (according to Poincare’s theorem) there is recurrence in 
systems governed by Newtonian mechanics: systems under Newtonian 
dynamics must return to their original condition (or, as close to it as we 
might like to insist) time and again. By contrast, Weiner pointed out, on 
the Systems approach time is unidirectional, and hence the novel is ubiq­
uitous. What do these two diverse claims, the one pertaining to the 
“shape” o f causal relations and the other pertaining to novelty and the di­
rectionality o f time, amount to? Do they have anything to do with each 
other? Weiner did not say (Perhaps he thought— mistakenly, o f  course—  
that their relationship is obvious.) I think there is something to what 
Weiner says. Something surprising. Something that Weiner him self might 
not have been prepared to accept. This something, as I shall be arguing, 
amounts to proclaiming that Systems analysis does not, strictly speaking, 
warrant the name o f causal analysis at all, and moreover, that it may very 
well be incompatible with Newtonian causal analysis— not just different. 
Indeed, that Systems analysis is concerned with a topic— namely, 
control— that goes beyond mere causation. It is o f  course in the area o f  
social science that systemic explanation has, notoriously, been contrasted 
with causal explanation— a matter to which we will return at the end o f  
this essay.
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Causal analysis seeks to model the sequence o f causes and effects, 
via causal laws. Here is an example with which we can work: water 
promotes plant growth. Such laws often must be construed as resistant to 
counterexample. For example, sometimes watering a plant too much will 
promote its decay rather than its healthy growth; and too little is no better; 
but neither fact should be sufficient to displace the generalization as a true 
causal law. And so causal laws are often construed as couched in 
(sometimes implicit) provisos that allow for a mean or average effect (and 
so we get the “exceptions that proves the rule”). The provisos spell out the 
details o f a “background” against which the cause, when it appears, 
explains production o f the effect. Sometimes these are referred to as 
"ordinary” or “standard” conditions. What are the standard conditions? 
They are very much case-specific. Causal analysis is thus straightfor­
wardly statistical analysis o f means, variations, and the conditions that 
make for variation from the mean.
The background conditions are traditionally referred to as “all- 
things-being-equal” conditions. They can fall into one o f two classes: ( I ) 
irrelevant conditions— conditions that make no causal contributions of 
any kind to production o f the effect; and (2) conditions whose contribu­
tion (whatever it might be) to production o f the effect is independent of 
the contribution being made according to the particular law we are now 
considering, so that with an appropriate randomization o f the population 
under scrutiny with respect to all these factors, the effects o f the causally 
relevant factor will be distributed normally (on a bell curve). So, for 
example, watering causes plant growth. But so also do certain soil 
nutrients and nitrogen. When the contributions o f each o f these things to 
soil growth is independent o f the others, then plant growth responds to 
each factor independently o f how it responds to the others. When these in­
dependence conditions in fact obtain, a suitably chosen population will 
show a random distribution in plant height, and treatment with water will 
shift the mean o f that population significantly. Similarly, a treatment with 
soil nutrients will shift the mean significantly as well, even when no 
change in water treatment is applied.
Suppose, however, that this independence does not obtain—perhaps 
(to stipulate the facts o f a hypothetical situation) nitrogen levels boost 
plant growth only in the presence of sufficient levels of moisture, whereas 
moisture always boosts growth, with or without the presence o f nitrogen.
2. Control, Not Causality’
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In this case, we might say that moisture modulates, m ediates  or m oderates  
the effects o f nitrogen. It is no small feat to make sense o f  this very simply 
describable situation within a causal paradigm. Here is why.
Cutting-edge causal modeling methodology— causal path analysis, 
utilizing analysis o f  variance— relies upon a certain paradigm for diag­
nosing the causal bearing (“relevance”) o f one factor upon another. The 
result o f  such an analysis is to divide up the variance, and attribute 
portions o f it (o f potentially different sizes) to independent players in the 
causal drama.6 According to the paradigm, causal bearing is revealed in, 
as Christopher Hitchcock refers to it, “test situations”: “A test situation is 
a conjunction o f factors. When such a conjunction o f  factors is condi­
tioned on, those factors are said to be ‘held fixed’. To specify what the test 
situations will be, then, we must specify what factors are to be held 
fixed.”7 (And this is why standard conditions are referred to as “all-things- 
being-equal” conditions.) In our hypothetical case, nitrogen (N), water 
(W) and plant growth (G) are the causal factors in question. To diagnose 
the causal bearing o f N  on G, we have to hold W “fixed,” but o f  course 
since water modulates the effects o f nitrogen, holding water fixed can 
mislead us as to the bearing o f N: if  we hold it fixed too low, we will not 
see a proper shift in the mean. We will thus not be able to diagnose a 
straightforwardly positive causal bearing o f N on G. (Effectively, what 
happens is that, rather than shifting a randomly collected sample popula­
tion from one bell curve o f  growth distributions to another bell curve, 
manipulations o f  nitrogen will produce either no shift at all, or a non-bell 
curve, indicating a more complex relation among the factors than causal- 
bearing analysis can effectively handle.) ,p' ' ‘
To handle this sort o f  example, causal modeling adopts an “interac­
tion” paradigm, on which the factors relevant to plant growth (in this case 
two) are multiplied, so that not only do we have water and nitrogen 
playing independent parts in the causal drama, but also their “interaction” 
too— a proportion o f their “cross product” (the cross product o f  their 
vector representations in the mathematical model). This fictitious entity is 
modeled as an independent causal player. How satisfying is this? One way 
to try to answer this question is to examine the founding principles o f cutting- 
edge causal modeling.
Causal modeling is built upon an important assumption. This is the 
so-called “Markov Condition,” which is a generalization o f Hans Reichcn- 
bach’s Principle o f Common Cause. Very roughly, the Markov Condition
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stipulates that the “causes” o f  X must screen X  off from  all other variables 
except for its own effects, so that correlations between X and other 
variables disappear once conditioned upon its causes. (Less roughly, if  Q i 
and Q j are correlated and Q i is not a cause o f  Qj. and Q j is not a cause o f
Qi, then there are common causes o f Qi and Q j in the set \Q ......,(>>„} such
that Q i and Q j are independent conditional upon these common causes.) 
And this condition stipulates that factors that have not (yet) interacted 
must be uncorrelated. Even if  this apparently innocuous assumption is 
true simply as a matter o f fact (rather than a matter o f necessity), what 
place does such a principle play in causal analysis? Let’s turn to the 
example again.
Applying the Markov condition to our nitrogen example, we have to 
say that the causes o f  plant growth— nitrogen, water and their interaction 
(water*nitrogen)— must be “initially” uncorrelated. In other words, that 
the water*nitrogen factor is, not only an independent causal factor, but 
also uncorrelated with water (as such) and nitrogen (as such). Another 
way to say this is that we have to orthogonalize  the contributions o f  each 
o f these players. We therefore use the Markov condition as a regulative 
ideal rather than as a simple assumption. And we do this in order to 
maintain the fiction that it is possible to attribute proper credit for a 
portion o f  variance to each o f independent causal players.
Now, even if  it makes some sort o f  sense to say that the interaction 
between nitrogen and water (the element water*nitrogen) is itself inde­
pendent o f both nitrogen (as such) and water (as such)— and indeed it 
does make sense because we simply construct the water*nitrogen factor 
(the cross product) so as to ensure it obeys our definition o f independence—  
how' can we construe the proposal that this interaction factor is a third  
factor? Presumably, all we are trying to get at, on this causal modeling 
proposal, is that water*nitrogen is a third thing that one needs to keep 
track o f  in order to make sense o f  what’s going on. But if  we accept the 
proposal, have we really made sense o f  the idea that water m odulates the 
effect o f  nitrogen? Or have we simple wished it away? Has the modula­
tion simply been masked over for expediency’s sake? I submit it has. I 
submit that the best this causal modeling can do for our special case is that 
it has identified some sort o f  dependence or link between the effects o f  
water and nitrogen. But among other things, this analysis has missed out
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on the asymmetricality in that dependence relation. The simple descrip­
tion “W modulates the effects o f  N ” speaks clearly o f an asymmetricality.
Some thinkers have suggested that the notion that causal factors must 
be thought o f as independent keeps us from making sense o f the notion o f  
modulation.8 My own view is that causal analysis, involving the diagnosis 
o f causal bearing as a categorical (on-off), is too coarse a tool to handle 
the sorts o f modulations we find in this hypothetical nitrogen example. 
What is happening in this case is that an environmental or contextual 
factor is coupling  with the variable whose magnitudes we are manipulat­
ing, in a way that obviates analysis in terms o f “independent contributions” 
o f different causal pathways. Thus the idea that the effect is under the 
control o f  the so-called “causal” variable whose bearing we are querying 
is inapt. The very notion o f control itself requires treatment. To handle 
modulation, I submit we require a different sort o f diagnosis altogether—  
one that allows for the context sensitivities we should like to put on display. 
Here is another way to put this point.
Causal analysis, resting as it does on diagnosis o f causal bearing, 
involves the foregrounding o f particularly salient contributory factors, 
against backgrounded conditions that are treated as largely negligible. It 
casts attention upon certain changing factors as causes (independent con­
tributions, contributory or detraction to production o f an outcome), at the 
cost o f casting other stationery conditions (to wit, conditions that are not 
changing in the present context) in the role o f background— and by im­
plication noncontributory— factors. Where the assumption o f “negligible” 
falls short, causal analysis papers over this fact by introducing the “cross 
product” to recover the negligibility, without illuminating how the cross 
product has done this. This sort o f analysis has its place, o f course. It gives 
us information that we might not otherwise be able to obtain. It gives us 
some very rough clues as to how to get things accomplished— for instance, 
how to ensure that adding nitrogen will have a desired effect. But where 
conditions favor it, there is room for another sort o f  analysis as well— one 
that retains in its crosshairs the “modulation” properties o f the so-called 
background.
This essay will thus argue that, for the purposes o f  accounting for 
important features o f large-scale behavior, the factors typically “back­
grounded” by causal analysis— and in particular, those comprising training
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histories, which make for the “precorrelations” that causal analysis attempts 
to define away— are really much more significant than normally given 
credit for in causal analysis. Indeed, that large-scale behavior is sharply 
attuned to the modulations and resonances (stored in “memories”) between 
entities and their surroundings. This is the province o f  systemic forms o f  
analysis, and where causal modeling misses out— by its own design— on 
important features o f  the (preconfigured) landscape. Because some 
systems exercise a capacity for memory, their interactions with their en­
vironments require different conceptual foundations. And moving to a 
science o f Systems acknowledges that a System’s context requires more 
attention than causal modeling can provide. It requires attention to the 
very notion o f  control.
To control is not simply to stand in a causal relationship (where by 
that we mean some kind o f probability-raising relationship, as presumed 
in path analysis) to some event, or even to a network o f  such events. 
Control is a matter o f authorities, a matter o f  which directives have a 
trumping effect (winning out when there is conflict); it is not essentially a 
local matter o f  where a process originates, nor is it a matter o f  which 
features o f  the world ultimately explain what the products o f  the process 
ultimately look like. Control is a global, all-over affair, a matter o f rank 
and protocol, and not well correlated with the outcome or goal o f  a 
process or procedure.9 So it is very difficult to diagnose when encountered 
on the ground.
Control is best illustrated by examples where by hypothesis we know 
what the p ro to co l is, or simply where we stipulate the control structure. 
Military organizations or militias are perhaps the best illustrations o f what 
we may call hierarchical control, and other examples o f  control are 
contrasts to it. Protocol is less a matter o f  what forces, factors, or 
influences are actively exercised (changing or being changed) during the 
relevant real-time process, and more a matter o f  global features o f  the or­
ganization involved in that process. Control over my car, for example, is 
what /, as driver, lose when the brakes o f  my car fail at the top o f  the hill, 
even if  I have occasion to call upon their service (and then entirely 
without success when I do) only at the bottom. During the period o f  time 
when I have no occasion to call on their service, matters will proceed 
exactly as they might well have done, had I indeed enjoyed control over 
them; still. 1 do not enjoy that control. Elsewhere 1 have adopted the
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following rough and provisional analysis o f  authority  or rank , preliminary 
to a mature account:
Axiom A: An entity, unit, or function A ranks over  a second entity, 
unit, or function B, when the edicts or instructions or processes o f  
A win out over those o f  B, in cases where the edicts or instruc­
tions or processes o f  the two are in conflict, or cannot go forward 
simultaneously.
Now, this axiom is palpably rough, and its roughness is instructive. 
Nothing in it takes into account any o f three important qualifying ideas 
that will ultimately have to be handled in a mature conceptual treatment 
o f  control: (1) (P artia lity) that ranking can be complete or partial: in other 
words, that it may leave entities uncompared as to rank: (2) (Circum­
scrip tion ) that it may be circumscribed rather than global, applying to a 
very clearly delimited range o f  operations; and (3) ( Tempering) that these 
two ways that a rank can be qualified or circumscribed might intersect or 
overlap in such ways as quickly confounds diagnosis o f the precise 
balance o f  partiality and circumscription on the ground. For now all we 
need is the simple conception o f  ranking, as a piece o f  the relevant meta­
physics for our examination o f  Systems analysis: it allows us to conceive 
o f control structures as structures that overlay lower-level causal struc­
tures, and govern when and where lower-level structures interact. They 
choreograph. They direct. They are the stuff o f  upper management.
One concept that has been common in the disciplines o f  psychology 
and neurophysiology since the 1950s is that o f  inhibition .10 This concept 
is indeed a genuine control concept, much more than it is a causal one. 
The concept o f  inhibition is (roughly) the concept o f  veto or brake: the 
controlling entity or process prevents an action, even one that is already 
going forward, from going to completion. Indeed, this notion presuppos­
es a notion o f  completion that has no place in path analysis. Inhibition is 
roughly one half the concept o f  ranking. The full concept also includes the 
controlling entity being, at least potentially, in a position to “arouse" or 
“excite” or “trigger” as well as inhibit. (This idea too has been in circula­
tion in physiology and psychology, in the theories o f  memory, attention, 
motivation, and learning.) Put together, arousal and inhibition would seem 
to be two necessary, and perhaps also jointly sufficient, pieces o f  the
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concept o f  rank. Perhaps it will turn out that to achieve more conceptual 
traction with the idea o f  ranking one will need to break it down further 
into these two component ideas. (Arguably, the two conceptions o f  
feedback, which are discussed below, are the two corresponding pieces.) 
And it seems at least initially plausible that the two halves o f  the control 
function can bc separated— that one entity or process can have inhibitory 
control over a second, but not excitatory control. It would serve us to in­
vestigate these sorts o f  questions further, at least conceptually. And when 
once a full complement o f  the necessary control concepts have been ar­
ticulated, it will be possible to give a detailed account o f  homeostasis and 
similar physiological and systems notions in purely metaphysical terms.11 
For our purposes here. Axiom A will have to suffice.
When does a collection o f objects under a scheme o f control also 
qualify as a System in its own right? And how can we explain this process 
by which a System gets built out o f  components? This is the engineer’s 
fundamental query.
3. Simon s  Criterion
When one performs an analysis in terms o f  control, one must draw 
prominent attention to certain important features o f  the control landscape. 
The notion o f  control we have set down refers to global (“all-over”) 
features o f a system. A control analysis describes a system’s actual state 
in relation to “nearby” potential states. It functions to track a system’s 
relative stab ility  in time, rather than track the specific means, in terms o f  
forces and other features, that may (or may not) be holding it together. For 
certain purposes, this is only important information to keep track o f— it is 
the kind o f  information never too far from the concerns o f  an engineer. 
Keeping track o f  such information about a system is very different from 
keeping track o f  its material characteristics as such. Keeping track of 
characteristics as bear on a system’s stability in time involves keeping 
track o f  its large scale (global) relations to other things in its context, 
actual and possible.
Herbert Simon, decades ago, sought to articulate a similar concep­
tion.12 He thought that certain features o f  certain systems could not be 
captured correctly by analysis o f their parts taken together with the 
specific and heterogeneously conceived interactions among them. His 
idea derives from his concern with building systems. The idea is that to
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build a complex system (as nature does), one proceeds in stages, with the 
result that at the end o f  each stage, what is constructed must possess a 
stable structure, so as to “hold still” whilst the next phase o f  operation is 
launched. Without these intervals or layers o f stability, complexity 
(according to Simon) is unsustainable. This makes complex systems 
typically: (a) modular; (b) intersubstitutive in their parts; (c) qualitatively 
similar with a change to their parts or their number; and (d) stable under 
reaggregations o f  parts.13 (Imagine trying to articulate these ideas within 
a path analysis!) Simon is thus reaching for the idea that a System under 
control has to be governed by high-order structures o f  stability that are rel­
atively independent o f  the sorts o f interactions (physiological, chemical, 
mechanical or what-have-you) that govern their parts more locally. A true 
System (with a capital S) is something special indeed, and subject to high- 
order laws o f  dynamics and control among its constituents. A system that 
does not obey such laws is one that very soon falls apart. As I will explain, 
this amounts to saying that a System, with a capital S, is one in which the 
aggregation o f  the parts has undergone a reduction in degrees o f  freedom.
This concern for layers o f  stability in complex systems comports 
very well with the notion o f  control we have here been at pains to articu­
late. Indeed, I would insist that Simon had his finger on just this notion o f  
control when he talked about system construction stages. Having explored 
the structural features o f the process by which Systems get built, we must 
now step back to look at the product, and therefrom extract a formal char­
acterization o f the key elements o f  it. The defining characteristic o f  the 
System that emerges from such a process is simply that it is built by the 
process— and is consequently subject to being added onto in the same way.
How do sites o f  systemhood coalesce? They do so along a variety o f  
different dimensions. The first and most obvious is that control can be secured 
over a certain array o f  independent resources; when this occurs so, we speak 
o f a pool o f resources or capacities. I will refer to this as the zeroeth dimension 
o f merger. And 1 will offer a roughly Lego model o f Systems formation. 
The zeroeth dimension is the emergence o f  a unit Lego block— the indi­
vidual System slice. In nature, this is the aspect o f  physiology.
Second, and also very familiar, sites o f  control can combine along 
different lifetime slices and developmental stages o f  the same entity or 
System; when they do, we speak o f  an individual system. This I will refer 
to as the vertical dimension o f  merger, conceiving o f time as advancing
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upwards. Individuals will be represented by columns or towers consisting 
o f unit blocks.
Finally, systemic entities can coalesce (across various types o f bound­
aries, living and nonliving); when they do, we speak o f coalitions. I will refer 
to this as the horizontal dimension, conceiving o f  coalitions as overlaps or 
unions in the horizontal plane. In the Lego model, a coalition is a multi­
unit block that joins more than one tower. Enduring coalitions will consist 
o f multi-unit towers rising vertically from the point o f  merger.14
We have thus resisted the temptation to treat any particular sort o f entity 
as an inalienably independent atom— a decision that amounts to a com­
mitment to diversity about atoms (as well as about independence). And 
concomitant with this rejected commitment is another— a commitment to 
treating systematic correlations or coordinations amongst these indepen­
dent systems as a matter o f incidental, “external,” or “ecological” interactions 
between them, rather than as systemic and inalienable properties o f  their 
confederation— their Systemhood. We are therefore laying the ground­
work for contentions to the effect that entities in community or communion, 
in addition to retaining a certain amount o f independence (at least in 
certain o f  their dealings), coalesce (predictably) at important conjunctions 
o f circumstance, forming molecular systems that interact in complex ways 
with each other, as well as with and upon the atoms themselves. We are 
thus urging that societies o f  entities can consist o f  systems within systems; 
that they are rich complexes o f intricately nested and overlapping 
systems. And that therefore higher-scale behavior, in all its forms, is best 
handled within a Systems approach. On this view, bonding is the funda­
mental characteristic o f  an entity, on a Systems analysis, because an entity 
is, from the Systems perspective, fundamentally a bond. (Another way to 
put this is to say that Systems are fundamentally units o f  aggregation.) On 
any other formula, systemhood, as a phenomenon, is bound to disappear.
How can we take stock o f  the elementally systemic— the fundamen­
tally confederate— dimension o f the lives o f Systems with their environments? 
How do we keep from making this dimension disappear— as we have seen 
that causal modeling makes it do? I am proposing that to ensure that the 
systemic does not disappear, we need to confer a degree o f freedom upon 
aggregates or confederations o f  entities and variables, as such— in order 
to give them a role in explanation. And this constitutes a profound departure 
from causal approaches to explanation, which rest upon the assumption o f
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independent atoms, and so are incrementally reductionistic. (This remark 
illuminates the point that reductionism rests fundamentally on a search for 
independent atoms, and that adherence to the Markov condition is reduc­
tionistic in just this sense.) When we seek a Systems analysis, we are 
instead postulating— not only that many systems are governed by Systems 
notions— but also that precisely the features o f  the systems that make 
them Systems also subject these systems to higher-order laws governing 
scale and organization. In the language we will be adopting straightaway, 
this amounts to saying that Systems enjoy different degrees o f  freedom  
than might be ascribed to them by a strictly causal analysis in terms o f  
their parts and matter— because there are degrees o f  freedom to be 
conferred upon molecular aggregates or bodies, as such, within a Systems 
framework. A suite o f technical notions is required to render this analysis, 
to which we now turn. As we will sec, it takes the framework o f analyti­
cal mechanics to make these notions possible.
4. D egrees o f  Freedom  in M echanics
I outline roughly here the contours o f two incompatible but noneth- 
less venerable formulations o f mechanics: Newtonian and Analytical.15 
The Newtonian formulation is causal in a straightforward sense; causes, 
on the Newtonian formula, are put one-to-one with forces. The analytical 
formulation is not similarly causal. This shall set the stage for subsequent 
argument (in sections following) to the effect that the Systems approach 
adopts the second— the analytical— conception o f  mechanics. But that 
Systems also goes beyond mechanics— adding to it. For the scope o f  
Systems is rather narrower. The central concern o f Systems analysis is not 
so much to furnish an account o f any system undergoing change, as to 
furnish an analysis o f system s under control. And the topic o f  control is 
itself beyond the reach and aspiration o f  mechanics proper. Toward its 
goals, Systems analysis articulates a notion o f control, a notion that is 
nearly as foreign to analytical mechanics as it is foreign to Newtonian 
mechanics. This is in itself strong evidence for the thesis that the topic o f  
control is not within the ambit o f the theory o f pure mechanics: any 
account o f control, even when it treats systems all o f  whose characteris­
tics are uncontroversially physical, must go beyond mechanics as such.
The central mission o f mechanics, in the modem tradition, has been 
to secure an account that accurately describes how changes in quantities
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take place over time. A natural description o f motion introduces vectorial 
quantities, with vectorial variables to portray them. The Newtonian for­
mulation o f general mechanics (historically the first comprehensive 
formulation) takes simple vectorial description o f such alterations one 
step further, for with each alteration in motion it postulates at least one 
entity— a vehicle or emissary, routinely interpreted as a cause— that 
brings about the alteration by communicating an influence in the appro­
priate direction or orientation. The distinguishing mark o f a Newtonian 
treatment is its utilization o f Newton’s Second law to formulae that enable 
computations o f changes in magnitudes o f motion variables.13
Not every continuous course o f magnitudes for a given quantity, 
beginning with the initial magnitude and ending with the final one, is o f  
concern in a Newtonian analysis, where by contrast all o f these alternative 
histories are much the object o f scrutiny in the second venerable branch 
o f physical mechanics. ^
Analytical mechanics, by contrast, originated with ideas o f Leibniz, 
Euler and Lagrange, and culminated in Hamilton and Jacobi’s equations 
o f  transformation. These equations enable us to write down differential 
equations describing covariations in certain observable quantities. Rather 
than conceiving o f  alterations in time as a blow-by-blow, push-me/pull- 
you narrative o f a drama o f forces-and-their-aftermaths, taking place 
amongst entities playing their individual parts on the physical stage, ana­
lytical mechanics conceives o f  alterations, instead, as a wave 
phenomenon— a kind o f global choreography without the notion o f per­
petrators. These wave disturbances take place in the space o f quantities 
known as the p h ase  space. There is no counterpart to force-metaphysics, 
the vehicle o f  influence communication, in this formulation o f mechanics. 
Simply, there are tides in the affairs o f  quantities, whereby they conspire 
to undertake alterations together, and in keeping with very general princi­
ples that make no mention o f causes as such. The distinguishing mark of 
analytical mechanics is the varia tional principle. Famous examples are 
Hamilton’s principle (to the effect that the integral, over a system’s path, 
o f the difference between kinetic and potential energies is always an 
extremum— either a maximum or a minimum) and Huygens’s principle 
for optics which leads to Fermat’s “principle o f quickest arrival” (to the 
effect that the path o f a light ray is distinguished by the property that if  
light travels from one given point M to another given point N along that
d
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path, it will arrive in the smallest possible interval o f time). Change in 
these quantities, on the analytical formulation, is thus treatable— and 
treated— without appeal to forces and their communication from one 
object, event, or state o f  affairs to another.
O f considerable concern also in analytical mechanics are alternative 
courses o f  magnitudes for quantities under study. Variational principles 
operate upon these alternative courses o f  magnitude to select as distin­
guished (when there is a unique solution to the problem) the actual one. 
In analytical mechanics the set o f possible trajectories must be in place, to 
make description o f the problem  complete, before application o f  a varia­
tional principle that selects among them a distinguished one as solution  to 
that problem. For the dynamical laws— the variational principles— are in 
their essence contrastive: they select that trajectory which possesses an 
extremum o f a particular characteristic, while presupposing that the set o f  
alternative trajectories has an independent specification. (The actual tra­
jectory emerges, according to Hamilton’s Principle, as a result o f  the 
existence o f  a unique potential trajectory meeting all boundary conditions, 
and possessed o f  an extremum— typically a minimum— in the difference 
between potential and kinetic energies.) And so, without prior specifica­
tion o f  the boundary conditions, not only is the system to be treated (the 
problem) underdescribed, but also— and consequently— the mechanical 
problem itself is ineligible o f  solution. For not only do the macrocondi­
tions and constraints help to identify the contrast set o f  potential 
trajectories, they also define that set. And in analytical mechanics they are 
treated as independent, both o f  actual magnitudes o f  microquantities and 
o f the principles o f  contrast that constitute the dynamical laws. Analytical 
dynamics thus regards boundary conditions as ( 1) independent o f dynamical 
law and (2) prior to it in ontology— since analytical dynamics must treat 
boundary conditions as a pre-existing problem subject to solution via 
variational principles. Analytical mechanics is thus a different beast, philo­
sophically, from Newtonian mechanics.
Each o f  these two conceptions or formulations o f dynamics, in tradi­
tional mechanics, requires embedding in a general theory o f quantities and 
their potential dependence relations. For alone, dynamics does not suffice 
to produce a thoroughly general treatment o f  motion and change over 
time. Specifically, dynamics does not contain a systematic treatment o f  the 
nature o f  quantities, and how they relate to each other, both as time goes
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on, and at any given instant in time. Once furnished, such an account will 
provide the means, at least in principle, whereby to assemble complete de­
scriptions o f  systems comprising enormous numbers, conceivably 
nondenumerable, o f  interacting bodies, with many internal parts (and thus 
with proportional numbers o f interacting quantities). But such a treatment 
will first have to answer questions like: How are macroquantities to 
related to microquantities? Do microquantities conspire together to form 
macroquantities? How? Do they always do so in the same way? Can the 
macro play all the same roles in mechanics that the micro does?
Take this porcelain cup I now drink from. What shall we say is the 
relationship between its microscopic realities— the to-ings and fro-ings 
amongst molecules that constitute it— and the fact that the cup shatters 
upon impact with my kitchen floor? Is the relationship a one-way affair, 
in which the microscopic gets absolutely all the credit for what happens at 
the more macro level? If we answer yes, then we endorse a dogma to the 
effect that the microscopic is— always and everywhere— master, and that 
the macroscopic is always and everywhere slave. Tightly coiled in this 
master-slave doctrine is the conception that only micro quantities can 
serve as degrees o f freedom— and this is a conception hostile to Systems 
analysis. But this very master-slave doctrine is nonetheless an implicit 
cornerstone o f the Newtonian architecture o f  analysis: it is an implicit 
axiom, in the Newtonian framework, that macro causes bring about macro 
effects entirely in virtue o f  the fact that micro causes bring about micro 
effects.17 For example, the cup o f our acquaintance shatters, according to 
this analysis, because certain intermolecular forces in it (in the porcelain 
that forms it), are in very fine and quantitative ways different from those 
in, say, a steel fork or a textile, and are such as to make the cup “fragile.”
By contrast, this master-slave doctrine is not enshrined in the Ana­
lytical formulation o f mechanics. It is an open question, on the analytical 
formulation, whether a cup’s fragility is an additional, independent 
property that belongs to it, in addition to others it possesses at the micro 
level, which might be displaced as poolings, mergers, and alliances are 
forged in Systemic fashion. Analytical mechanics can accommodate a 
decision to model such properties as independent. Given its philosophical 
structure— which is far less rigid— analytical mechanics can thus allow a 
certain macroconditions, associated with a given System, to sw ing free  so 
to speak from micro conditions, and (to use the language o f diplomacy)
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analytical mechanics permits us to represent the object so swung free to 
the rest o f  the world by a reduced number o f (typically more macro) con­
ditions. Analytical mechanics thus allows us to acknowledge that object’s 
Systemhood as such. And this is what we require if  we are to allow  
Systems, as such, to possess degrees o f  freedom as wholes.
The key to this achievement is that analytical mechanics neither ac­
knowledges nor incurs an obligation to introduce quantities, such as 
forces, that mediate between the actual and the possible. Second, it views 
certain macroconditions o f  a system (conceived either as boundary condi­
tions— for example, the condition o f being fixed to a certain track— or as 
magnitudes o f macroquantities) as capable o f preceding in ontology mag­
nitudes o f microquantities with which that system, as a System, interacts. 
In other words, the laws acknowledged by analytical mechanics do not 
rule out (as do both Newtonian dynamics and the Markov condition), a 
pre-existing correlation between quantities in a System or in a System- 
situated. Analytical mechanics, as contrasted with Newtonian mechanics, 
allows for (even demands) the independence o f  conditions describing a 
“pre-existing” correlation. For example, it allows us to treat a train 
“clinging” to its track as a pre-existing condition— a kind o f “designed” 
and therefore nonnegotiable feature. This shows decisively that the prin­
ciples o f  analytical mechanics are quite different from those o f  Newtonian 
mechanics, and potentially incompatible with them, as they are potential­
ly incompatible with cutting-edge causal analysis.
The analytical conception o f a system in analytical mechanics is, as
I will refer to it, contextual. By this I mean that analytical mechanics 
views it as inappropriate to request characterization o f  a physical system  
taken “in isolation,” if  by that is meant “without specification o f  boundary 
and/or design conditions.” For, on the conception o f  system that emerges 
here, there is no such entity as this system  in sp lendid  isolation, i f  this 
system is not already in splendid isolation.18 Portrayal o f a system, on the 
analytical approach, is always o f a system situated, rather than o f a 
system-by-itself. And this is just what we need for a Systems analysis: the 
room for ineliminable pre-existing conditions. What they amount to is 
something else entirely, as we will soon see.
Now, Systems analysis is itself an application o f  analytical 
mechanics. But Systems is a very special sort o f application. In a Systems 
treatment, just as in an analytical one, there is no predesignation o f certain
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quantities as causes, and others as effects. Rather, there is a certain respect­
ful silence regarding what may qualify as legitimate choice o f dynamical 
variable. Moreover, Systems moots the question whether bodies are just 
assemblages o f quantities. Systems, as I will now show, makes a beginning 
at an account o f “body” or “unity,” by identifying a spatial boundary— a 
membrane or skin— between what shall count as “body” or “figure” and what 
shall count as “surround” or “ground.” Thereby Systems adds what we can 
with good reason refer to as “perspective.” Systems analysis thus makes a 
beginning at the job that mechanics (as such) declines: the job o f counting 
the number o f bodies, thought o f as the number o f unified objects, in a 
given region. And so Systems is an application o f analytic mechanics, but 
one that takes an important philosophical step towards meeting biology 
and psychology half way.
5. Systems, Feedback, and Control
Analytical mechanics provides a hospitable framework for Systems 
analysis, providing the sufficient flexibility within which to confront 
directly the question o f what makes a body a unity, and not just an un­
structured assemblage o f quantities. Systems analysis is thus a transformative 
rendering o f mechanics, aiming to bring into focus within the discipline 
o f dynamics concepts that are more unapologetically at home in physiol­
ogy. How? By introducing an innovation: the notion o f a boundary between 
that which is under the System’s control— its body— on the one side, and 
environment, on the other; it offers a nonarbitrary opposition between 
inside and outside, where mechanics alone will countenance only fields o f  
force and their “effects” amongst quantities, or variational principles and 
their aftermaths. Thus Systems offers the making o f a rudimentary con­
ception o f organ, and therewith function. Systems achieves this marvelous 
feat, as I will now show, by taking for granted the notion o f equilibrium, 
which is to be sure a physical conception— indeed a thermodynamic one 
— but not a mechanical one. The condition o f  equilibrium obtains in the 
controlled (the “internal”) regime.
In thermodynamics, equilibrium is defined as that condition o f a system 
in which a small number o f thermodynamic quantities— distinguished among 
them, temperature— remain unaltered indefinitely into the system’s future.
Systems analysis o f  a given system begins with tabulations o f certain 
quantities (I will refer to them as { a j )  o f the target System S, together
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with certain other quantities (I will refer to them as {pj}) o f that System’s 
environment E. The whole business is assumed to remain throughout the 
time o f analysis in a state o f quasi-equilibrium, or (as I will refer to it 
hereafter) a state o f control. (The term “homeostasis” is sometimes used 
here. I will not use it, as it suggests— falsely— the existence o f a unique state 
or condition that control processes are targeting.) This means that, through­
out the time o f analysis, alterations to features o f S+E off-list o f tabulated 
quantities are for all intents and purposes irrelevant. This assumption is 
not trivial or innocuous. And it is not available for all systems in which 
someone might wish to take an interest. In fact, it is precisely the condition 
under which a Systems analysis is valid. The condition obtains only under 
circumstances in which control (as we will now discuss) is possible.
Thus Systems analysis supposes, first o f all, ab initio, that control is 
possible. Then it proceeds with description o f how that control is attained. 
Control is attained when the controller system S acts (literally) to bring its 
own condition to within tolerance o f a prescribed reference point. This is 
done via feedback  loops.
In one sort o f feedback loop— the positive  feedback  loop— a System  
responds to changes in a variable (say pj) in the sam e  direction as the 
perceived change: when detection o f a drop (for example) in pj occurs, S 
takes steps to further increase that drop. In contrast, a system set up to 
respond to changes in any o f  the variables being tracked (any o f a, or pj) 
by making changes that reverse  a perceived change (by taking steps to 
move that variable in the direction opposite to the perceived change) is 
acting in a negative feedback  loop. :
The onset o f  contractions in childbirth operates on a positive feedback 
loop: when a contraction occurs, the hormone oxytocin is released into the 
body, which stimulates further contractions. This results in contractions 
increasing in amplitude and frequency. Blood clotting is another example. 
The process is initiated when injured tissue releases signal chemicals that 
activate platelets in the blood: an activated platelet releases more 
chemicals to activate more platelets, causing a rapid cascade and the 
formation o f a blood clot. A nursing female’s production o f milk increases 
at its young’s demand. The “launching” o f a physiological function thus 
involves amplification o f an initially minor change (in itself or its envi­
ronment). But if  the activity initiated is not to be ultimately destructive to 
the System, the process must be halted before its escalation reaches cata­
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strophic proportions. How does a System know the right time to arrest a 
process it has itself launched?
In most cases, once the process’ target is reached, a second process 
comes online to damp further escalations. The damping process requires 
negative feedback loops: these loops reverse the “launching” mechanism 
by activating processes that counter changes to a variable: childbirth con­
tractions stop when the young has been expelled; chemicals that break 
down blood clots are released at a suitable time; lactation stops when the 
baby no longer nurses. “Control,” as Weiner correctly observed, is in the 
first instance over oneself. Only secondarily or derivatively is it control 
over the environment. , ■ , : w . p
Physiological control is thus expressed in one part to launch processes 
to bring about a new target state, and in another part to damp potentially 
runaway internal processes that threaten a system’s integrity. In both 
cases, robust physiological systems are alert to important “reference points,” 
both internal to themselves and in environmental variables. And they treat 
different reference points differently to achieve this control. Reference 
points are fundamental physiological universals.
When control is achievable in the way just described— that is to say, 
when background equilibrium conditions favor it— the states o f S+E can 
themselves be regarded as a system o f interconnected equilibrium condi­
tions that can be reached by fine tuning operating characteristics (for 
example, the reference points and what they trigger) o f the control device
S. Cybernetics, then, is the study o f the properties o f networks o f inter­
connected equilibrium conditions, often in relation to reference points. It 
encompasses precise treatments o f  the performance o f control apparatus, 
and features special attention to defective behavior that tends to bring 
about oscillations (from mild to violent) in control quantities, when 
control apparatus is poorly designed, mishandled, diseased, infected by a 
foreign control apparatus, or generally overloaded.
Many biological systems fall squarely and unapologetically within 
the scope o f  a Systems analysis. Consider the flocking o f birds. Dynami- 
cists have only in recent decades been developing the idea that their 
remarkable synchrony o f motion can be explained by simple local adjust­
ments to motion (“rules o f  flocking”) mediated through sensory 
modalities such as vision, sound, pressure, or odor detection. Assuming 
that each organism in a flock can sense local flockmates as well as its en­
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vironment, and adjusts its own motion on an ongoing basis, Craig Reynolds 
devised a computational model o f  flocking “boids” based upon the following 
“rules o f  engagement" :19
1. Separation: steer to avoid crowding local flockmates in your “near 
neighborhood.”
2. Alignment: steer towards the average heading o f  local flockmates.
3. Cohesion: steer to move toward the average position o f local 
flockmates.
In effect, flocking requires uniformly o f  each flock member only that it 
reacts to flockmates within a certain small neighborhood around itself, 
characterized by a distance  and an angle  (measured from the organism's 
own vector o f  motion). Flockmates outside this local neighborhood can be 
ignored. (Similar models have been devised to model the collective 
foraging behaviors o f  social insects, for example, ants in an ant colony.)
But details o f the large scale features o f  the synchronized motion 
matter a great deal— because flocking needs to be very finely tuned if it is 
to serve the interests o f  the flock. So how, precisely, does fine tuning o f  
the “rules o f engagement” scale to collective properties o f  the larger 
motion? For example, how does adjustment o f  the size o f  the neighbor­
hood affect sensitivity to environmental features? How does it serve in 
location o f  food and avoidance or predators? The answer might surprise: 
much depends upon features o f the flock's “rules,” and not at all on any 
feature o f  any given organism in the flock. The “rules” concern “all-over” 
characteristics, that might well be shared with flocks o f  very different 
species, and in no way depend upon the biology o f  the species. They are 
control characteristics, that have to do with how a flock o f  N boids reduce 
their degrees o f  freedom in flight.
We can illustrate this reduction in the context o f  our present flocking 
example. Close behavioral coupling among near neighbors in a flock 
allows a localized change in direction to be amplified and propagated 
across the flock. This allows each flock member to influence and be 
influenced by flockmates much farther away than their local neighbor­
hood— it gives each a much larger “effective perceptual range” than their 
actual sensory range. This scaling is nonlinear. Study o f the details o f  the
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scaling relations reveals that it is hard for groups to maintain cohesion if  
the coupling distance is too short. Longer-range transfer o f information is 
enabled by increasing the coupling distance. Increasing the coupling 
distance further still creates a cohesive group, but “misinformation” might 
be propagated (as use o f information about motion o f distant individuals 
is in some circumstances less beneficial locally). Damping processes will 
thus prove useful if  long-range transfer o f information is absolutely essential.
In addition, coupling can be moderated by context. For example, if  
individual birds in flight conditioned their reactions upon context (under 
threat, for example, aligning more strongly with distant flockmates, in­
creasing “system gain”), this could allow for some flexibility, but there is 
a cost. Heightening sensitivity to weak or ambiguous environmental 
signals increases susceptibility to “false positives,” and damping response 
to local fluctuations in less threatening contexts increases “false negatives.” 
A balance has to be struck.
What has becomc more and more dear in this discussion is that a 
flock o f hundreds o f organisms, operating under a set o f  “rules o f engage­
ment,” is decidedly not a system with degrees o f  freedom on the order of 
hundreds: it is instead a system with something on the order o f a dozen 
degrees, counting among them rough size, coupling distance, and level o f  
context sensitivity, as well as environmental variables that tend to couple 
with these features. From a flocking perspective, a flock is an entity with 
a reduced number o f degrees o f freedom than there would be without the 
rules. And some o f these degrees lie in the environment itself! These 
degrees o f  freedom have displaced many or most o f the “micro” variables 
that reign when the boids are not flocking, as soon as the flock members 
begin governing themselves by the rules o f  engagement.
The flock couples to its environment to achieve flock-specific goals 
or activities. It is a System with a memory. And so its behavior is modulated 
by features o f the environment, in much the same way that nitrogen modulates 
plant growth in the example that opened this essay.
One point already mentioned can be usefully reiterated here, by way 
of repelling potential criticism to the effect that Systems analysis is no 
more than a certain, possibly distinctive style o f  causal modeling. It is 
important to emphasize that Systems analysis leaves out vast amounts o f  
detail, pertaining to quasi-equilibrium quantities, that would be required 
in any causal treatment o f (for one thing amongst many) feedback loops—
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such as for instance the size, shape, and other dynamical features o f  
different boids in that array that constitute the flock. Indeed the equilibri­
um conditions do not themselves come in for much handling. They are 
simply taken for granted. And vast amounts o f  detail are left out too per­
taining to the interactions between control quantities (coupling distance, 
for example) and those that remain largely unchanged (perhaps average 
distance to nearest neighbors), or simply those that change in ways that do 
not impact control o f  the process. This fact testifies to the idea that 
Systems analysis is supremely uninterested in certain detail— in the 
causes (if  you will) that mediate between controlling quantities and con­
trolled. Systems analysis focuses simply on the dynamical aspect o f  
control, not on the (underlying, if  it is that) aspect o f how control is 
wrought or maintained.20
6. Com plexity
It has been said that we need Systems analysis because the world is 
complicated. Because there are more particles (and so more quantities) 
than a mathematical model governed by Newton’s laws can handle. Its 
necessity is a matter o f practicality— an “applied” rather than a theoreti­
cal matter— not a matter o f  principle. Systems analysis is thus, according 
to this idea, a concession to human frailties.21 And therefore we stoop to 
Systems analysis because it’s a simple and incontestable fact o f  life that 
only superhuman intellect or yet-unattained mathematical facility can 
handle the computational complexities we face when we attempt to treat 
in theory the real-life, many-body systems we manipulate on those 
everyday occasions in which we seek to achieve a measure o f  control. 
Complexity is thus an occasion for throwing up one’s hands and giving in 
to a lesser form o f  analysis.
Our analysis here gives us the resources to repel this argument. For, 
while the argument insists that complexity is always with us, even when 
conditions are right (that is, when the special sort o f equilibrium condi­
tions obtain) for control, our analysis has insisted that— to the contrary 
— only a small set o f  conditions make control possible. So that complex­
ity, if  it does anything, can do no other than make control ovei'whelmingly 
unlikelyl For complexity— as such— is precisely what one typically has on 
hand in all those many circumstances when control is just not in the cards.
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Introducing the notion o f complexity here thus only draws a veil o f  mystery 
about what may not be all that mysterious. It is, ultimately, a red herring.
And so, in reply to critics who insist that we need Systems analysis 
because Systems analysis handles better the complexity o f relations 
amongst highly interactive quantities under control conditions, we ought 
to reply that we need Systems, not so much because the world is so complex 
(though it is frequently complex), but rather in sp ite  o f it. Systems does 
not oversimplify, as those who protest o f  complexity charge. Indeed, it 
brings into focus what the complexifiers insist on obscuring: namely, that 
certain dependence relations, at the heart o f  certain protocols, are the 
ground o f control. Protocols are (as we noted already) simplifiers and not 
complexifiers. And so Systems analysis— analysis o f higher-order depen­
dence conditions— is analysis o f  how complexity is reduced. And Systems 
brings (finally) into clear focus an urgent question not seen before— a 
question that Systems analysis itself, as such, cannot answer: Why are 
quasi-equilibrium conditions as ubiquitous as they are? And hence: Why 
is control as possible as it is? It is a question for which I have seen no 
answers o f  any kind suggested, plausible or otherwise. Here, perhaps, is 
where study o f  complexity can usefully come in. -r ; ■
7. Functional Explanation
Emile Durkheim proposed to explain, holistically, the existence o f  
certain large-scale features o f  society by way o f a proposal to the effect 
that societies are wholes with needs, purposes, or goals that exert pressure 
on their parts to behave so as to meet or achieve said needs or goals. (For 
example, he proposed to explain the existence o f  criminal activity, as “an 
act that offends very strong collective sentiments,” by the fact— if it is a 
fact— that criminal behavior functions to promote social solidarity.) This 
functional brand o f explanation, as now it is called, is regarded as prob­
lematic if  no feedback mechanism is identified.22 But thinkers on the 
subject now proclaim that once a feedback loop is specified, this “then 
turns out to do most or all o f the explanatory work in an unpuzzlingly 
causal way.”23 For this and other reasons, cause and explanation are now  
broadly considered synonymous.
I, by contrast, maintain that Systems analysis and causal analysis are not 
synonymous. Indeed, feedback loops are proprietary to Systems analysis, 
but not to causal analysis as such. Feedback loops o f the sort needed to 
support the persistence o f  a large-scale feature invoke a notion o f equilib-
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num. And so we have to separate conceptually the notion o f feedback from 
the notion o f causal explanation: the ideas do not belong to the same family.
But a note o f caution must also be sounded: Systems analysis does 
not guarantee achievement o f any goal, however cherished. It acknowl­
edges goals, and can describe in abstract terms (that is to say, in terms o f  
the reference points that enter into patterns o f stability and quasi-equilib­
rium) the conditions that make achievement o f some o f them possible. It 
is another matter altogether whether the conditions obtain. There may be 
no explanation o f why they obtain when they do so. And this is among the 
many things one needs to know when one is seeking an explanation o f a 
large-scale phenomenon: one wants to know (for example) which factors 
in the environment promote, sustain, or thwart criminality (in one instance) 
or religious fervor (in another). Want o f attention to conditions that make 
achievement o f goals possible is precisely what makes functionalism so 
unpalatable. So a Systems explanation is certainly an improvement upon 
the functional explanations o f old. But o f course there is plenty o f room 
for disputing that Systems, all on its own, provides all that is or might be 
wanted in the way o f explanation for large-scale social phenomena. And 
all this holds true whether we are considering a functional explanation for 
prevalence o f crime, or for a mechanism that maintains bodily tempera­
ture within a certain range o f tolerance.
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